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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRAVIS JOHNSTON and 
AMBER BARRICK, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 20010027-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendants appeal from conditional guilty pleas to one count each of attempted 
forgery, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-6-501 (1999). This Court 
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does a defendant commit forgery when, without authorization of the purchaser, 
defendant fills in her name as payee on a money order that is made out for a sum certain 
and then endorses and cashes the money order? 
This Court will "review for correctness a trial court's statutory interpretation, 
according it no particular deference." In re PS., 2001 Utah Ct. App. 305, ^  10, 432 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 (quoting State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (additional 
internal quotation omitted)). 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are contained in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109 (1997) (bearer or order instruments); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-115 (1997) (incomplete instruments); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501 (1999) (forgery). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State originally charged each defendant with one count of forgery, a third 
degree felony. R. 1,61. Following the denial of their motion to dismiss, both defendants 
entered conditional guilty pleas to charges of attempted forgery, class A misdemeanors. 
R. 31-36, 86-91, 123: 6-7. The trial court sentenced defendants to twenty-four months 
probation, and ordered them to serve 14 days in the Utah County Jail, pay a fine of 
$740.00, and restitution of $33.59. R. 44-46, 105-07. Defendants timely appealed. R. 
60, 121. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants found a money order made payable in the amount of S33.59, but with a 
blank payee line. R. 15. The money order bore the signature and address of the 
purchaser. Id. Defendants wrote one of their names—Amber Barrick—on the blank 
payee line. Id. Ms. Barrick then endorsed the money order and defendants cashed it, 
receiving S33.59. Id. The purchaser of the money order did not know either defendant 
and did not authorize or intend that any money be paid to either of them. R. 14-15. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court's recent decision in State v. Baggett, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 286, is 
dispositive of this appeal. In Baggett this Court rejected the very argument defendants 
now raise. 
Even if this Court were not to rely on its unpublished opinion in Baggett, 
defendant's claims still fail. Defendants' claim that they did not commit forgery rests 
entirely on their assertion that this Court should look to the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) in interpreting the forgery statute. The forgery statute controls, however, and it is 
clear and unambiguous. Under the plain language of the statute, defendants "altered" the 
money order without authorization, and also "completed" the money order so that the 
completion purported to be the act of another. Either act constitutes forgery. 
Even if the Court were to apply the UCC, defendants still committed forgery 
because they "altered" the money order under two provisions of the UCC. The 
defendants "altered" the money order by transforming it from a bearer instrument to an 
order instrument, and also by completing the otherwise incomplete instrument. An 
unauthorized "alteration" of a writing constitutes forgery. Therefore, defendants are 
guilty of forgery even if the Court applies the UCC. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Defendants argue that "in inserting Barrick's name in the pay to order line [they] 
did not 'complete' the money order" because, under the UCC, the money order "was a 
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complete negotiable instrument payable to any bearer/' Br. of Aplt. at 5 (internal 
quotation marks added). This Court has already rejected this argument in State v. 
Baggett, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 286.l 
In Baggett, the defendant argued that he did not "complete*' a check, when he 
filled in his name on the blank payee line, because the check was already completed 
bearer paper under the UCC. Id. at If 3. This Court rejected the defendant's arguments, 
holding that the completion of a blank payee line, without authorization, constituted 
forgery. Id. at f^lf 3-4. This Court also rejected the defendant's invitation to look to the 
UCC to clarify the forgery statute, holding that "the language of the Forgery Statute is 
plain and unambiguous." Id. at f 4. 
Defendants in this case assert the same argument this Court has already rejected in 
Baggett. Therefore, defendants' claims fail as a matter of law. 
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE NOT TO RELY ON 
BAGGETT, DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS STILL FAIL BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO NEED TO LOOK TO THE UCC TO 
INTERPRET THE PLAIN AND UNAiMBIGUOUS FORGERY 
STATUTE. 
"In construing any statute, [this Court will] first examine the statute's plain 
language and resort to other methods of statutory interpretation, only if the language is 
ambiguous. Accordingly, [this Court will] read the words of a statute literally . . . and 
give the words their usual and accepted meaning." Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
1
 Although Baggett is an unpublished opinion, the State has filed a motion for 
leave to cite the unpublished opinion on the grounds that it is dispositive of this appeal. 
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Comm >*., 2000 Utah Ct. App. 372, If 9, 21 P.3d 231 (internal quotation omitted). "[A] 
statutory term should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of 
the statute." State v. Bohne, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 11,17, 18 P.3d 514. 
The forgery statute states that a person commits forgery if, "with purpose to 
defraud anyone . . . he: (a) alters any writing of another without his authority or . . . (b). . 
. completes, . . . any writing so that the writing or the . . . completion, . . . purports to be 
the act of another . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(1 )(a) & (b) (1999). This language 
is plain and unambiguous. Defendants do not even suggest, let alone demonstrate, that 
the forgery statute is ambiguous. Therefore, there is no need to look to the UCC in order 
to interpret the forgery statute. 
Under the plain language of the forgery statute, defendants both "altered" and 
"completed" the money order. "When a statute fails to define a word, [this Court will] 
rely on the dictionary to divine the 'usual meaning.'" Hercules, 2000 Utah Ct. App. at <[ 9 
(quoting State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). The definition of 
"alter" is "to cause to become different in some particular characteristic." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 63 (1993). Defendants clearly 
caused the money order to become different in some particular characteristic when they 
filled in the otherwise blank payee line. R. 15. Because they did so without authority, R. 
14-15, this "alteration" constituted forgery. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(l)(a) 
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(1999); see also People v. Pool, 522 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (holding that 
defendant altered a money order when, without authority, he filled in his own name as 
payee and endorsed it). 
The definition of "complete" is "to make whole, entire, or perfect." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 465 (1993). The defendants 
clearly made the money order whole, entire, or perfect when they filled in the blank payee 
line. R. 15. Because defendants purported this "completion" to be the act of the 
purchaser of the money order, they committed a forgery under this provision of the 
forgery statute as well. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(1 )(b) (1999). 
State v. Donaldson, 385 P.2d 151 (Utah 1963), upon which defendants rely, is 
distinguishable. In Donaldson, the defendant urged the court to reverse his conviction for 
issuing a check against insufficient funds. 385 P.2d at 151. He argued that the 
instrument he issued was a "bill of exchange," rather than a "check, draft or order for the 
payment of money upon a bank" because he had not filled in the name of a payee on the 
check. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that the instrument was indeed a check, even 
though it did not state the name of a payee. Id, at 151-52. The court observed that the 
omission of a payee on an otherwise completed check does not affect its negotiability, but 
allows any bona fide holder to fill in the payee blank and is payable to the bearer until a 
particular payee is named. Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that when the 
defendant tendered the otherwise complete instrument as payment for gasoline, he had 
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issued a "check," and had authonzed any bona fide holder to fill in the payee blank. Id. at 
152 (emphasis added). Donaldson did not analyze or even mention the forgery statute. 
In this case, the purchaser of the money order never tendered it to anyone; rather, 
she lost it. R. 15. Defendants knew that the money order was lost and that they were not 
bona fide holders. R. 14-15. Furthermore, the issue here is not whether an instrument is 
negotiable, as in Donaldson, but whether a writing was completed. Thus, Donaldson is 
distinguishable. 
III. EVEN IF THE UCC APPLIED, DEFENDANTS WOULD 
BE GUILTY OF FORGERY BECAUSE THEY ALTERED 
THE MONEY ORDER BOTH BY TRANSFORMING IT 
FROM A BEARER INSTRUMENT TO AN ORDER 
INSTRUMENT AND BY COMPLETING IT. 
Even if the UCC applied to this case, defendants are guilty of forgery because they 
altered a writing of another without her authority. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501( 1 )(a) 
(1999). Defendants' actions amount to an "alteration" of the money order under either of 
two provisions of the UCC, the first dealing with bearer and order instruments, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109 (1997), and the second dealing with the completion of an 
incomplete instrument, see id. at § 70A-3-115 (1997). 
First, defendants "altered" the money order by transforming it from a bearer 
instrument to an order instrument. Under the UCC, a "bearer instrument" includes a 
promise or order that does not state a payee. "A promise or order is payable to bearer if 
i t : . . . (b) does not state a payee." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(l)(b) (1997). 
Conversely, an "order instrument" is an instrument payable to the order of an identified 
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person. "A promise or order that is not payable to bearer is payable to order if it is 
payable to the order of an identified person, or to an identified person or order. A 
promise or order that is payable to order is payable to the identified person/' UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 70A-3-109(2) (1997). 
Bearer and order instruments are distinct and have different negotiability 
requirements. "If the instrument is payable to bearer, it can be negotiated by delivery 
alone. If it is payable to the order of an idenuucu person it cannot be negotiated without 
the indorsement of that person." 2 Frederick M. Hart & William F. Willier, Negotiable 
Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1C.12[1], at 1C-27 (2001) (footnote 
omitted). An instrument cannot be both a bearer and an order instrument; the concepts 
are mutually exclusive. "Since the definition of an order instrument excludes instruments 
that are payable to bearer, if an instrument is payable to bearer it cannot be payable to 
order." Id. at § 1C.12[5], at 1C-32. 
Defendants "altered" the money order when they wrote in one of their names on 
the blank payee line. As defendants contend, when they found the money order it was 
payable to bearer under the UCC because it did not state a payee but was otherwise 
complete. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(l)(b) (1997). When they wrote in one of 
their names as payee, R. 15, defendants "altered" the money order by transforming it from 
a bearer instrument to an order instrument. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-109(2) 
(1997). See also, State v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1052, 1052-53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding 
that defendant altered a writing when he added a payee to a blank payee line on an 
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otherwise completed check and thus transformed the check from a bearer instrument to an 
order instrument); State v. Herrera, 18 P.3d 326, 329-30 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that defendant did not alter a writing where he did not transform the wnting from a bearer 
to an order instrument). Defendants did not have authorization to "alter" the money 
order. R. 14-15. Thus, defendants would be guilty of forgery even if the UCC applied. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501(1 )(a) (1999). 
Defendants also "altered" the check under a second provision of the UCC because 
they completed an incomplete instrument. The UCC states that an "'[incomplete 
instrument' means a signed writing, whether or not issued by the signer, the contents of 
which show at the time of signing that it is incomplete but that the signer intended it to be 
completed by the addition of words or numbers." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-115(1) 
(1997). A jury could reasonably infer, based on common experience, that when the 
purchaser obtained a money order made out for a certain amount, but left the payee line 
blank, R. 15, that she later intended to complete the money order by designating a payee. 
Thus, the lost money order was an "incomplete instrument" under the UCC. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 70A-3-115(1) (1997). 
Defendants "altered" the "incomplete instrument" when they added one of their 
names to the blank payee line without the purchaser's permission. R. 14-15. "If words or 
numbers are added to an incomplete instrument without authority of the signer, there is an 
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alteration of the incomplete instrument under Section 70A-3-407.": Id. at § 70A-3-
115(3). See also 2 Hart & Willier, § 1C.12[5], at 1C-33 (stating that if a blank payee line 
is filled in without the authorization of the drawer the instrument becomes "an alteration 
of an incomplete instrument/'). Thus, defendants are guilty of forgery under this section 
of the UCC as well because in completing the incomplete instrument, they "altered" the 
money order without the purchaser's authorization. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
501(l)(a) (1999). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm defendants' convictions. 
REQUEST FOR PUBLISHED OPINION BUT NOT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because this appears to be a recurring issue, the State respectfully requests that the 
Court issue a published opinion for the guidance of the bench and bar. However, the 
State does not request oral argument. 
Respectfully submitted this D day of December, 2001. 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
2
 Section 70A-3-407 states that '"[alteration' means an unauthorized change in an 
instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party, or an 
unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument 
relating to the obligation of a party." UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-3-407 (1997). 
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Addendum A 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(DA person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniae 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
70A-3-109. Payable to bearer or to order. 
( D A promise or order is payable to bearer if it: 
(a) states that it is payable to bearer or to the order of bearer or 
otherwise indicates that the person in possession of the promise or order 
is entitled to payment; 
(b) does not state a payee; or 
(c) states that it is payable to or to the order of cash or otherwise 
indicates that it is not payable to an identified person. 
(2) A promise or order that is not payable to bearer is payable to order if it 
is payable to the order of an identified person, or to an identified person or 
order. A promise or order that is payable to order is payable to the identified 
person. 
(3) An instrument payable to bearer may become payable to an identified 
person if it is specially indorsed pursuant to Subsection 70A-3-205U). An 
instrument payable to an identified person may become payable to bearer if it 
is indorsed in blank pursuant to Subsection 70A«3-205<2). 
70A-3-115. Incomplete instrument* 
(1) "Incomplete instrument" means a signed writing, whether or not issued 
by the signer, the contents of which show at the time of signing that it is 
incomplete but that the signer intended it to be completed by the addition ot 
words or numbers. 
(2) Subject to Subsection (3), if an incomplete instrument is an instrument 
under Section 70A-3-104, it may be enforced according to its terms if it is not 
completed, or according to its terms as augmented by completion. If an 
incomplete instrument is not an instrument under Section 70A-3-104, but, 
after completion, the requirements of Section 70A-3-104 are met, the instru-
ment may be enforced according to its terms as augmented by completion. 
(3) If words or numbers are added to an incomplete instrument without 
authority of the signer, there is an alteration of the incomplete instrument 
under Section 70A-3-407. 
(4) The burden of establishing that words or numbers were added to an 
incomplete instrument without authority of the signer is on the person 
asserting the lack of authority. 
